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Conley: Evidence--Witnesses--When Witness Competent as to hand-writing of
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
EVIDENCE-WITNESSES-WHEN WITNESS COMPETENT AS TO

HAND-WRITING OF DECEDENT.-In an action upon a note purporting to have been made by a person now deceased, the
plaintiff testified that through an extended mutual correspondence carried on with the decedent she had become
familiar with the signature and handwriting of the decedent. The plaintiff's evidence that the signature to the
note was that of the decedent was excluded on the ground
that such evidence involved a personal transaction or communication with the decedent, and was inadmissible under
Ch. 130, § 23 of the WEST VIRGINIA CODE (1923). Held,
that the evidence was admissible, and was sufficient to make
out a prima facie case for the plaintiff. Poole v. Beller, Executor, 140 S. E. 534 (W. Va. 1927).
The court followed the test laid down in Johngon v. Bee,
84 W. Va. 532, 100 S. E. 486, 7 A. L. R. 252 in which the
court said: "Whether the witnesses were competent depends upon the means by which they obtained the knowledge of the handwriting of the decedent, constituting the
basis of their opinions." One who has received letters or
other writings from the supposed writer under circumstances which create a presumption that they were really
written by him is competent to give an opinion on the handwriting of such writer, 11 R. C. L. 620. But there is a conflict of authority as to whether knowledge of handwriting
acquired in this way is admissible under the statute. See
Johnson v. Bee, supra, and 40 CYc. 2327 for cases supporting
both views. The better view is that taken by the court
in the principal case that such knowledge does not involve
a personal transaction or communication, and evidence
based upon it is admissible.
In Johngon v. Bee, supra, the witnesses obtained their
knowledge of the handwriting by reading letters written
by the decedent to their mother, and preserved in the family as heirlooms. Clearly this knowledge did not involve a
personal transaction or communication with the decedent,
as the letters were not written to the witnesses, and the
court did not have any difficulty in holding that evidence
based upon knowledge obtained in this manner was admissible. In the prinoipal case the witness acquired her knowledge through a -mutual correspondence carried on with the
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decedent for a number of years, and while it is not so clear
that this knowledge does not involve a personal transaction or communication, this was held to be sufficient to make
the evidence admissible and make out a prima facie case.
This is a liberal construction of the statute, and the result is
desirable, for the rule laid down in the statute is generally
thought to be unsound and is open to all the arguments
which have done away with the common law rule making
interest a disqualification of all witnesses. WIGMORE on EvIDENCE, p. 707, § 578; p. 699, § 576. Virginia has practically
abolished the rule excluding evidence of a personal transaction or communication with a decedent, VIRGINIA CODE (1924)
§ 6208, but § 6209 takes the view that cross examination
alone would not be a sufficient safeguard for the estate of
the decedent, and requires that the witness's sole testimony
be corroborated, and if such witness testify, all entries,
memoranda, and declarations by the decedent relative to
the matter in issue are admissible. While West Virginia
retains the rule, it places upon it. a liberal construction, and
holds that evidence admissible under this liberal construction makes out a prima facie case, without corroboration.
While no doubt it would be better if the rule were abolished, this liberal construction by the court does not cause
the hardships which would result from a strict construction
of the statute.
-JOSEPH

G. CONLEY.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-GARNISHMENT-WHO

EXEMPT

THEREFRO.-A, clerk of the county court, died leaving funds
unaccounted for, collected by him but belonging to the
county. His administrator was sued by the county court
and the depositary was garnished. Held, that property in
the hands of the personal representative of the decedent is
not subject to garnishment by the creditors of the estate.
The county is not a preferred creditor. The funds are
not impressed with a trust in its favor. State v. Whyte. M
86
S.. E. 860 (W. Va. 1927).
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